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Abstract: This paper analyses the reasons behind the long-term underperformance of 
China's stock market. We argue that the price growth of local state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) is hindered by the control of state shares by local cadres, who often sell the 
shares below market prices during their time in office. Our empirical analysis reveals 
that political turnover of prefectural Party Secretary has a significantly negative 
impact on the selling of state-owned shares and the price growth of local state-owned 
enterprises, while there is no such impact on private enterprises and state-owned 
enterprises controlled by the central government.  
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1. Introduction 
    From the time since its establishment in the 1990s, the Chinese stock market 
remained stagnant from 2000 to 2013, and has been consistently failing to achieve its 
expected growth. Figure 1 shows the closing prices of the Shanghai Composite Index 
from 1991 to 2013.  
 
Figure 1. The Shanghai Composite Index  
 
Source: China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database 
 
The market experienced rapid growth from 2005 to 2006 as a result of SOE share 
reforms. Huang et al. (2008) test for structural change in the Chinese stock-price level 
caused by the nontradable share (NTS) reform. Using the net-of-market-trend stock-
price series, it is shown that the NTS reform drives stock prices up in more than two-
thirds of the cases.However, this proved to be an isolated event because the growth 
was only temporary. Using a multivariate cointegration and vector error correction 
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model, Liang and Willettt (2015) show that economic factors have a long-term 
equilibrium relationship with stock market performance in China. After the Chinese 
stock market crashed in 2007, stock variations became more responsive to changes of 
economic fundamentals suggesting that there had been a bubble. Overall, the growth 
rate of China’s stock market still significantly lags behind the country’s average 10% 
economic growth rate, even after including the stock market’s sharp rise in the first 
half of 2015. 
Since the stock exchange was established, the Chinese government has practiced 
a “quota system”, which only allows state-recommended companies to be listed. As a 
result, listed companies are mostly SOEs. In 1999, the quota system was replaced by 
the approval system, which allows companies to go public upon fulfilling a number of 
conditions, thus increasing the percentage of non-state-owned listed companies. By 
the end of 2012, SOEs held by local governments (local SOEs) accounted for about 
26% of the total stock market by market value, and SOEs held by the central 
government (central SOEs) accounted for as much as 48%. The average stock price of 
local SOEs rose by only about 20%, far below that of the central SOEs and the 
privately owned companies, which rose by about 31% and about 75% respectively. 
The underperformance of local SOEs is therefore a prominent cause of the 
sluggishness in the stock market.  
We argue that the ambiguity with regard to the property rights of SOEs, and the 
agency problem in SOEs, are major causes of staggered stock price growth. Central 
SOEs in China are under the jurisdiction of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), the Ministry of Finance, 
or other related departments. Local SOEs are controlled by local SASACs or other 
related municipal departments.  
The central government only allows state shares to be traded through private 
agreements, rather than through public offerings. This private and non-transparent 
trading mechanism leaves room for local cadres, mainly a city’s Mayor and Party 
Secretary, to sell state shares at low prices for personal gain. Buying firms are often 
owned by local officials, or by other closely connected individuals. There are two 
ways to sell state shares: 1) by introducing new shareholders or 2) by having the 
parent company divest state shares, which is more common. As the performance of 
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local SOEs is not directly linked to the professional interests of local cadres,2 they 
have a high incentive to sell state shares at low prices for private benefits before they 
leave office,3 which is a major obstacle to the price growth of local SOEs. 
In addition, such under-the-table transactions may be known by the public, which 
might decrease trade volumes on the stock exchange, and indirectly affect the market 
price of the stocks. Previous studies (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Chen, 
Hong and Stein, 2002; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Ofek and Richardson, 2003; 
Cochrane, 2003; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Mei et al., 2009) analyse the 
connection between trading volumes and stock prices from the perspective of 
optimistic investors’ speculative motives. Our paper contributes to the literature by 
revealing that political turnover might also influence prices through reducing the trade 
volumes.  
We use the turnover frequency of prefectural Party Secretaries and prefectural 
Mayors during 2001 to 2012 to proxy prefectural political turnover.  The results show 
that the political turnover of Party Secretaries does have a significantly negative 
impact on the selling of state-owned shares, while there is no impact on the selling of 
stock shares of the private enterprises and central SOEs. Furthermore, the political 
turnover of Mayors has no impact on the selling of stock shares. By using political 
turnover as an instrumental variable of the selling of state-owned shares, the 2SLS 
estimates show a significantly negative impact on the stock prices of local SOEs, 
while there is no significant correlation between the selling of stock shares and the 
stock prices of private enterprises and central SOEs. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background of this study. Section 3 presents the model and the estimation results. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background 
                                                 
2 Oi and Rozelle (2000) and Kung, Cai and Sun (2009) argue that the behaviours of local cadres are determined 
mainly by two factors: career incentive and revenue incentive. The former incentive might curb the selling of state 
shares, while the latter might stimulate officials to sell state shares for personal benefits before their departure. See 
also Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012), Opper and Brehm (2007) and Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim (2013).  
3 Reasons for leaving office includes being transferred, promoted or demoted. 
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2.1 The share of SOEs in the stock market 
    In 2012, 833 out of around 2,600 listed companies in China were local SOEs, 
which are under the jurisdiction of local SASACs or other related municipal 
departments. Local cadres, especially the Party Secretaries of cities, control the trade 
of state-owned shares. Local cadres are promoted or transferred once every three or 
five years, regardless of the performance of local SOEs. Because of their relatively 
short tenures, they might be indifferent to the negative impacts of selling state shares 
below market value if doing so could bring them personal benefits. As a result, we 
observe a much larger reduction in shares held by the majority shareholders in local 
SOEs than in private enterprises.  
In this paper, we calculate the percentage increase of stock prices, where the 
starting value is the daily closing price in the beginning of 2003 and the ending value 
is the average daily closing price between 2003 and 2012. We use the average daily 
closing price rather than the price of the last day of the period (31 December 2012), 
because the former is not affected by the volatility of daily stock prices. Between 
2003 and 2012, the percentage increase in the prices of local SOEs was about 20.3%, 
while those of private enterprises and central SOEs were about 75.8% and about 
31.1%, respectively.  
 
2.2 The trading of state shares 
    Table 1 reports the average decline of shares held by majority shareholders of 
local SOEs, central SOEs, and private enterprises. We calculate the percentage of 
reduction in shares held by majority shareholders, where the starting value is the 
number of shares in 2003 and the ending value is the average number of shares held 
by the majority shareholders in each year between 2003 and 2012. We have taken into 
account the rights issues in the calculations. Table 1 shows that since 2003, the 
decline in the number of shares held by majority shareholders in local SOEs has been 
more significant than those in private enterprises and central SOEs. The decline in 
local SOEs is about 1.5 times that of the private sector, and 3 times that of central 
SOEs.  
Since there are only around 200 listed central SOEs, the reduction of shares in 
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central SOEs is less than that in local SOEs due to there being a smaller number of 
central SOEs. Most central SOE leaders are ministerial-level officials, and out of 
career concerns are less likely to sell state shares during their tenure, as this presents a 
much higher probability of being promoted. Additionally, the central government also 
implements much stricter regulations for selling state shares in central SOEs than in 
local SOEs. 
 
Table 1: Differences in the reduction of shares held by the majority shareholders between 2003 
and 2012 
 
 Number Min (%) Max (%) Mean (%) 
Private Enterprises 850 -67 0 -12.24 
Local SOEs 833 -65 0 -18.00 
Central SOEs 267 -81 434 -7.63 
 
 
Source: China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database  
 
There are three levels of local SOEs, namely the provincial, prefectural and 
county levels. Table 2 shows the political turnover of Prefectural Party Secretaries, 
reduction of shares of the majority shareholders, and price growth. Note that from 
Table 2, more frequent political turnover in Prefectural Party Secretaries has resulted 
in a significantly greater selling of state-owned shares and significantly negative 
impacts on the price growth of local state-owned enterprises. There are no similar 
impacts on private enterprises and state-owned enterprises controlled by the central 
government.  
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Table 2 Political turnover of Prefectural Party Secretary, reduction of shares held by majority 
shareholders and price growth 
Local SOEs Private enterprises & Central SOEs 
Political 
turnover 
(frequency) 
Low (1-3) High (4-5) Political 
turnover 
(frequency) 
Low (1-3) High (4-5) 
Decrease of 
state shares 
-0.102 -0.125 Decrease of 
state/Majority 
Share-
holders' 
shares 
-0.048 -0.055 
Price growth 18.227 8.622 Price growth 7.32 7.52 
Obv. 526 277 Obv. 901 455 
Source: China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database, City Records. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Reduction of shares held by majority shareholders 
      In this subsection, we analyse the cross-sectional differences in the reduction of 
shares owned by a sample of 2662 listed companies from the CSMAR Database and 
“10jqka” Financial Service Net. 
The listed company is defined as a local SOE if its majority shareholder is a local 
SASAC, a municipal department, or a school. If the majority shareholder is the 
central SASAC, the listed company is defined as a central SOE. The listed company 
is defined as privately held if a family, an individual or a foreign investment entity 
directly controls the firm.  
Dependent Variable 
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     For firm i, we define  
 
bpricei as the closing price of the first trading day in 2003;  
 
pricechangei =( P2003-2012, i – bpricei ) / bpricei x 100 
 
where 
P2003-2012, i is the 10 year average daily closing price between January 2003 and 
December 2012 of firm i. 
Key Independent Variable 
We let iCEOtradevo  be the percentage reduction of shares held by the majority 
shareholder of firm i between 2003 and 2012, where 
CEOtradevoi = ( MS2012, i   MS2003, i  ) / MS2003, i  x 100 
MS2003, i is the ratio of shares held by the majority shareholder to the total shares 
of firm i in 2003; 
MS2012, i is the ratio of shares held by the majority shareholder to the total shares 
of firm i in 2012.   
IVs 
        Among the 833 local SOEs, less than 10 per cent belong to the county-level local 
government, while around 40 per cent belong to the prefectural local government. The 
remaining 50 per cent belongs to the provincial-level government, which is located in 
different prefectures. We use four indexes to proxy political turnover. The first is the 
frequency of turnover of prefectural Party Secretary during 2003 to 2012, which 
varies from 1 to 6. The second is the frequency of turnover of prefectural Mayor, 
which varies from 1 to 6.  The third is the political turnover of provincial Party 
Secretary for provincial SOEs and political turnover of prefectural Party Secretary for 
Prefectural-level and lower SOEs. The fourth is the political turnover of governors of 
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provinces that have provincial SOEs, and political turnover of mayors of prefectures 
for those Prefectural-level and lower SOEs. 
Controls 
Other explanatory variables include the initial number of shares owned by the 
majority shareholders in year 2003, denoted by “ initial ”, and two dummy variables 
for local SOEs and central SOEs, denoted as SOE  and COE , respectively. We also 
include firm-level variables (as defined in Table 3) that might affect both the trade 
volumes and the performance of listed companies, such as their size, debt-paying 
ability, anti-risk ability and growth ability.  
 
Table 3: Definitions of firm-level independent variables 
Variable Name Definition 
 Total assets of a firm in 2012 
 Ratio of total debt to liquid assets in 2012 
 Net operating revenue divided by total 
profit in 2012 
 Ratio of prices to earnings in 2012 
 
    Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Dependent Variable 
 2614 0.123 45.219 0.398 2.297 
1
0
 
 
Key Independent Variable 
 2527 -81 434 -14.8 6.911 
IVs 
citySecretary  2038 1 6 2.625 0.915 
Major  2034 1 6 3.295 0.886 
provSecretary  2038 1 6 2.963 0.898 
Governor  2034 1 6 3.335 0.887 
Controls
 2527 0.16 100 43.049 16.785 
SOE  2504 0 1 0.335 0.472 
COE  2435 0 1 0.122 0.328 
 2656 2562376 1.87E+13 4.98E+10 6.45E+11 
 2656 -4.898 442.319 0.187 8.584 
 2656 -0.684 50.459 0.614 2.164 
 2250 0.987 13125 128.561 604.109 
 2590 0.27 600.4 22.408 569.774 
  
    To study what affects the percentage reduction of shares held by the majority 
shareholder, we estimate the following model: 
iiiiii XCOESOECEOtradevo   10                                                  （1） 
  
1
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   Table 5 reports the estimation results. Note from Table 5 that, compared with private 
firms and central SOEs, the reduction of shares held by the majority shareholders in 
local SOEs is significantly higher. 
 
 
Table 5: Regression results: dependent variable = CEOtradevo 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 -11.290*** 
（4.060） 
-8.801** 
（4.255） 
-12.790*** 
（4.339） 
SOE  -2.028*** 
（0.564） 
 -2.546*** 
（0.596） 
COE   -0.908 
（0.826） 
-2.066 
（1.863） 
 -0.359*** 
（0.015） 
-0.361*** 
（0.016） 
-0.354*** 
（0.016） 
 1.076** 
（0.190） 
0.943*** 
（0.199） 
1.145*** 
（0.204） 
 -2.265*** 
（0.837） 
-2.178** 
（0.880） 
-1.700** 
（0.883） 
 -0.005 
（0.027） 
-0.006 
（0.027） 
-0.003 
（0.027） 
 -0.001** 
（0.0004） 
-0.001** 
（0.00048） 
-0.001** 
（0.00048） 
Adj R2 0.216 0.210 0.216 
 2109 2078 2078 
Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, 
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represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
3.2 Effects of reduction of shares held by majority shareholders 
    To investigate the impact of a reduction in shares held by the majority shareholders 
on stock prices, we estimate the following model: 


iiiii
iii
XCEOtradevoCOECEOtradevoSOE
CEOtradevoepricechang


** 21
0
                                          (2) 
    Table 6 reports the estimation results. 
 
Table 6: Regression results: dependent variable = pricechange 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 20.081*** 
（2.320） 
20.404*** 
（2.371） 
20.082*** 
（2.401） 
 -0.022 
（0.015） 
0.012 
（0.014） 
0.008 
（0.018） 
CEOtradevoSOE *  0.052*** 
（0.021） 
 0.084*** 
（0.023） 
CEOtradevoCOE *   0.127*** 
（0.032） 
0.106*** 
（0.034） 
 -0.326*** 
（0.016） 
-0.324*** 
（0.016） 
-0.321*** 
（0.016） 
 -0.537*** 
（0.104） 
-0.557*** 
（0.106） 
-0.535*** 
（0.108） 
 -0.289*** 
（0.110） 
-0.322*** 
（0.119） 
-0.315*** 
（0.119） 
1
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 -0.023 
（-0.017） 
-0.024 
（-0.017） 
-0.024 
（-0.017） 
 -0.0002 
（0.0003） 
-0.0002 
（0.0003） 
-0.0002 
（0.0003） 
Adj R2 0.157 0.160 0.155 
 2458 2465 2656 
Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the results in Table 6. First, for private 
enterprises, the reduction in shares held by majority shareholders does not have a 
significantly negative impact on stock prices. Second, the negative impact of the 
reduction in shares held by majority shareholders in local and central SOEs is 
significant.  
3.3 Political Turnover and Stock Price 
There are several reasons why the effects of the reduction in shares held by the 
majority shareholder in local and central SOEs are negative. First, due to the non-
public and non-transparent mechanism of state share trading, the negotiated selling 
prices of state shares can be much lower than market prices. Among the 1221 cases of 
selling state shares, 605 of which are sold for free. The remaining 616 cases were sold 
at a price below the market price4.  For private enterprises, majority shareholders tend 
to sell shares at the market prices. This explains why the negative impact on local and 
central SOEs is significantly higher than that on private enterprises. Second, political 
turnover leads to the selling of state shares at a much lower price, with the public 
knowing about such transactions shortly after their completion, resulting in a decrease 
of the trade volume and the stock price. The trade volume in the year state shares are 
sold is usually 20-50 per cent lower than normal, while the price is much lower.  
                                                 
4 Data are collected from Auction and Transfer of State Shares Dataset, CSMAR. 
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Take the Shanghai International Port (Group) Co., Ltd as an example. The 
Shanghai SASAC held about 75.19% of state shares in 2004, which decreased to 
about 44.23% in 2005. After remaining unchanged for a long period, this decreased to 
about 40.28% in 2011. Furthermore, the average daily trade volumes on the stock 
exchange in the years 2005 and 2011 were the lowest throughout the ten years. 
      3.3.1 2SLS Estimates 
      Table 2 has shown a close correlation between the frequent turnover of Prefectural 
Party Secretaries, selling of state shares, and the price growth of local SOEs. Here we 
use the turnover frequency of prefectural Party Secretaries between 2003 and 2012, 
and the turnover frequency of prefectural Mayors as an instrumental variable of the 
selling of state shares. The results are shown in Table 7. Panel B shows that the 
political turnover of Party Secretaries has a significantly negative impact on the 
selling of state-owned shares, while there is no impact on the selling of stock shares 
of private enterprises and central SOEs. Furthermore, the political turnover of Mayors 
has no impact on the selling of stock shares. By using political turnover as an 
instrument of the selling of state-owned shares, Panel A shows that the selling of 
state-owned shares has a significantly negative impact on the stock prices of local 
SOEs, while there is no significant correlation between the selling of stock shares and 
the stock prices of private enterprises and central SOEs. 
 
Table 7: Political Turnover, State-owned Shares and Stock Price of Local SOEs 
 Party Secretary Major 
 Local SOEs Private 
Enterprises 
and Central 
SOEs 
Total  Local SOEs Private 
Enterprises 
and Central 
SOEs 
Total  
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates 
 4.882*** 
(0.242) 
2.303*** 
(0.602) 
3.005*** 
(0.711) 
9.472 
(18.111) 
2.525 
(2.003) 
5.487 
(4.738) 
1
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 0.076*** 
(0.019) 
0.013 
(0.066) 
0.039 
(0.078) 
-0.518 
(1.759) 
-0.012 
(0.226) 
-0.250 
(0.555) 
CEOtradevoSOE *
 
  0.132*** 
(0.030) 
  -0.048 
(0.172) 
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adj R2       
 641 1274 1915 640 1271 1911 
Panel B: First Stage 
 10.242*** 
(1.943) 
0.367*** 
(0.078) 
11.877*** 
(1.243) 
9.562*** 
(2.596) 
0.271*** 
(0.069) 
9.326*** 
(1.244) 
citySecretary  -0.0005*** 
(0.00005) 
-0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.519 
(0.322) 
   
SOESecretarycity *    -0.488** 
(0.193) 
   
Major     0.215 
(0.702) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.345 
(0.300) 
SOEMajor*       -0.567*** 
(0.199) 
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
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 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adj R2 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.21 
 641 1274 1915 640 1271 1911 
Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
3.3.2 Party Secretary and Governor of Province as IV 
      Table 8 shows the correlations between the selling of state shares and the turnover 
of Party Secretaries and Governors of different provinces. Panel B shows that 
although the political turnover of Party Secretaries and Governors have a negative 
impact on the selling of state-owned shares, it is not significant. Provincial-level Party 
Secretaries and Governors have a much weaker relationship with local SOEs than 
prefectural level leaders, which makes it easier for the latter to sell state shares. 
Furthermore, provincial level leaders are more hesitant to sell state shares, as the 
opportunity cost of corruption is too high for them.     
 
Table 8 Party Secretary and Governor of Province as IV 
 Party Secretary Governor 
 Local SOEs Private 
Enterprises 
and Central 
SOEs 
Total  Local SOEs Private 
Enterprises 
and Central 
SOEs 
Total  
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates 
 3.644 2.303*** 6.064** 2.316 2.525 20.734 
1
7
 
 
(9.200) (0.602) (2.567) (5.105) (2.003) (38.987) 
 0.142 
(0.762) 
0.013 
(0.066) 
0.012 
(0.070) 
0.244 
(0.465) 
-0.012 
(0.226) 
-0.411 
(1.119) 
CEOtradevoSOE *    0.125*** 
(0.025) 
  0.022 
(0.381) 
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adj R2       
 735 1274 2009 734 1271 2005 
Panel B: First Stage 
 44.093 
(34.393) 
0.367*** 
(0.078) 
43.992*** 
(2.580) 
43.436 
(33.800) 
0.271*** 
(0.069) 
41.347*** 
(2.590) 
provSecretary  -0.285 
(0.328) 
-0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.603* 
(0.314) 
   
SOESecretaryprov *    -0.604*** 
(0.195) 
   
Governor     -0.027 
(0.182) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
41.347 
(0.300) 
SOEGovernor *       -0.671*** 
(0.183) 
 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
1
8
 
 
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adj R2 0.19 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.08 0.21 
 735 1274 2009 734 1271 2005 
Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
3.3.3 Another Measurements of Price Change 
To examine whether the results are robust after the change of the dependent 
variable, we redefine 2epricechang  
as  
 
iepricechang 2   
= (one year average daily closing price in 2012 of firm i  bpricei )/ bpricei x 100 
The results are reported in Table 9. Overall, we find minute variations with Table 7. 
 
Table 9: Robustness check: dependent variable = 2epricechang  
 Party Secretary Major 
 Local SOEs Private 
Enterprises 
and Central 
SOEs 
Total  Local SOEs Private 
Enterprises 
and Central 
SOEs 
Total  
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates 
 31.183*** 11.655 21.862*** 179.814 9.926 70.893 
1
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(8.346) (3.647) (8.153) (444.033) (13.085) (87.727) 
 1.595* 
(0.919) 
-0.056 
(0.372) 
0.222 
(0.594) 
-12.918 
(43.199) 
0.136 
(1.411) 
-5.520 
(10.111) 
CEOtradevoSOE *
 
  1.311** 
(0.582) 
  0.424 
(3.065) 
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adj R2       
 641 1274 1915 640 1271 1911 
Panel B: First Stage 
 10.242*** 
(1.943) 
0.367*** 
(0.078) 
11.877*** 
(1.243) 
9.562*** 
(2.596) 
0.271*** 
(0.069) 
9.326*** 
(1.244) 
Secretary -0.0005*** 
(0.00005) 
-0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.519 
(0.322) 
   
SOESecretary*
 
  -0.488** 
(0.193) 
   
Major     0.215 
(0.702) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.345 
(0.300) 
SOEMajor*       -0.567*** 
(0.199) 
 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
2
0
 
 
 Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adj R2 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.21 
 641 1274 1915 640 1271 1911 
Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, 
represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 
4. Conclusion 
    Previous studies on the stock market of China employ GDP or other 
macroeconomic variables to explain the ups and downs of the market. Such an 
approach is somewhat problematic because the stock market of China does not grow 
proportionally to its GDP. This puzzling phenomenon has not yet been fully explained 
in the literature. This paper analyses the long-term underperformance of China's stock 
market through highlighting the effect of the principal-agent problem in China’s 
bureaucratic system, and argues that the sluggishness of the Chinese stock market is 
due to the underperformance of SOEs. As Fama and French (1992) postulate, small 
firms tend to outperform large firms, which helps explain why private firms 
outperform SOEs in China. However, firm size effect cannot completely account for 
our results, as the percentage increase of the prices of large central SOEs is not the 
lowest in our findings.  
We argue that the slow growth of the stock prices of SOEs can be attributed to the 
reduction in shares held by majority shareholders, as outgoing local cadres possess 
incentives to sell state shares at a lower price during their tenure for private benefits. 
We conclude that the ambiguity of SOE ownership, the network-dominated promotion 
scheme of Chinese officials, and the illiquidity of state-owned shares are the major 
reasons for the long-term sluggish performance of the Chinese stock market. To boost 
the stock market, the Chinese government should promote transparency in the 
transaction of state shares. In addition, local officials in control of the SOEs should be 
2
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made accountable for their company’s performance. The development of a derivative 
market might also contribute to the process of price discovery in SOEs, and thus 
reduce incidents of stock manipulation. 
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